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Abstract
Structural models for analyzing competitive markets characterized by homogeneous
products and services such as the public utility can be traced back to 1920’s. To
the authors’ best knowledge, the literature focuses on pure strategies and analysis for
mixed strategies are largely ignored. However, the peculiarity of the public utility often
allows only mixed strategies as a meaningful basis for analyzing the price competition.
The purpose of this paper is to ﬁll this gap by developing a duopoly model with
two symmetric customers with mixed strategies. A necessary and suﬃcient condition
is given for the existence of Nash equilibrium when mixed strategies are deﬁned on
a ﬁnite set of L discrete points spread in a ﬁnite interval. In addition, the Nash
equilibriums are constructed explicitly when L discrete points are chosen in such a
way that their reciprocals are equally distanced. The limiting strategies as L → ∞
are also derived explicitly.
Keywords: OR in energy, public utility, two person game, mixed strategy, limiting
strategy
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1 Introduction
While the price strategy plays a signiﬁcant role in any business, it is of crucial impor-
tance to the public utility industry including electricity and gas because of several reasons.
Firstly the public utility industry provides homogeneous products across diﬀerent suppliers.
Large-scale industrial customers are quite sensitive to prices of the public utility products.
Although service quality for energy consulting, security and the like would be quite impor-
tant for such industrial customers, because of the product homogeneity, the price strategy
of a supplier is the key to diﬀerentiate the company from the rest and to establish its com-
petitiveness in the market.
A second reason to emphasize the price strategy in the public utility industry can be
found in that the industry has been deregulated in many advanced countries since near the
end of the previous century, including the United States, EU countries and Japan. The
deregulation is intended to device a variety of ways to lower barrier for new entry and the
industry has been exposed to rapidly growing severe price competitions.
Lastly, it is important to realize that the public utility industry still faces certain
customs for price setting which come from the public nature of the industry. Before the
deregulation in Japan, for example, it is customary to oﬀer a common price table, called
the universal price table, to all customers at their site, provided that the total demand, and
hourly and monthly load factors over a year are more or less the same. In addition, the
universal price table cannot be altered frequently, say at most once in a few years. Such
practices concerning the price strategy are still in eﬀect to some extent even after the dereg-
ulation.
Structural models for analyzing competitive markets characterized by homogeneous
products and services such as the public utility can be traced back to 1920’s. The original
paper by Hotelling(1929) deals with the duopoly situation where two suppliers compete
over customers uniformly distributed on a ﬁnite line by choosing their locations and prices.
D’Aspremont et al.(1979) show non-existence of Nash equilibrium unless the two suppliers
are located relatively far apart. Economides(1986) extended the Hotelling model by intro-
ducing customers uniformly distributed on a plane. Anderson(1987) incorporates stackel-
berg leadership within the context of the Hotelling model. Other variations include Thisse
and Vives(1988), Zhang and Teraoka (1998) and Rath(1998). Gabszewicz and Thisse(1992)
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provides an excellent review of the literature. More recently, for a spatially duopoly model
with customers located at diﬀerent nodes having separate demand functions, Matsubayashi
et al.(2004) establish a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of Nash equilib-
rium and develop computational algorithms for ﬁnding the equilibrium point.
The literature dicussed above focuses on pure strategies and analysis for mixed strate-
gies has been largely ignored, to the best knowledge of the authors. Since the universal
price table is still in eﬀect to some extent and cannot be altered easily once they are set for
a certain period even after the deregulation in Japan, it is of crucial importance to consider
mixed strategies by reading the price strategies of competitors at the time of bidding. This
means that the role of mixed strategies has been increasing its importance in analyzing the
public utility industry.
The purpose of this paper is to ﬁll this gap by developing a duopoly model with two
symmetric customers and to establish a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence
of Nash equilibrium when mixed strategies are deﬁned on a ﬁnite set of L discrete points
spread in a ﬁnite interval. In addition, the Nash equilibriums are constructed explicitly
when L discrete points are chosen in such a way that their reciprocals are equally distanced.
The limiting strategies as L →∞ are also derived explicitly.
The structure of this paper is as follows. In Secion 2, a duopoly model with two
symmetric customers is introduced and a game-theoretic framework is described formally.
Section 3 establishes a necessary and suﬃcient condition under which a Nash equilibrium
within discrete mixed strategies exists. By choosing discrete pricing points in a peculiar
way, the Nash equilibriums are constructed explicitly in Section 4. Section 5 is devoted to
derive the limiting behavior of the strategies derived in Section 4 as L →∞.
2 Model Description
We consider a market consisting of two suppliers and two customers, where each supplier
provides a homogeneous service such as city gas or electricity and each customer may rep-
resent one large industry or a group of residents in the same district. For convenience, the
near customer of supplier i is deﬁned as customer i and the distant customer as customer
3 − i, i = 1, 2 as depicted in Figure 2.1. The market is assumed to be symmetric in that
a) both suppliers have the same costs cH and cL for providing service to the distant cus-
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Figure 2.1: Two Supplier Two Customer Model
tomer and the near customer respectively where cL < cH ; b) both customers have the same
demand D ; and c) each supplier has to oﬀer a uniform price upon delivery to both of the
two customers despite the cost diﬀerence. Each supplier provides its service only when it
results in a positive return to do so and each customer chooses the supplier which oﬀers
the lower price. When the two suppliers happen to oﬀer the same price to a customer, the
demand of the customer is split evenly between the two suppliers. Since the service under
consideration is typically a public utility service, it is also natural to assume that there
exists a price upper bound. Accordingly, one has
πi ∈ I = [cH , U ], i = 1, 2 (2.1)
where πi is the uniform price oﬀered by supplier i. It should be noted that, if c
L < πi ≤ cH ,
supplier i monopolizes its near customer and the price can be increased to cH without losing
its monopoly of the near customer. In what follows, we describe a general game structure
deﬁned on the strategy set I.
Let (Ω,F , P ) be a probability space, and let RV be a set of random variables deﬁned on
(Ω,F , P ) with full support on I = [cH , U ]. More speciﬁcally, for AX(α) = {ω|X(ω) ≤ α},
we deﬁne
RV = {X|X : Ω →R, AX(α) ∈ F for ∀α ∈ R} (2.2)
where R is the set of real numbers. It should be noted that, for any A ⊂ R, we write
P [X ∈ A] =
∫
ω∈Ω
δ{X(ω)∈A}P (dω)
where δ{X(ω)∈A} = 1 if X(ω) ∈ A and 0 else. In particular, it should be noted that P [X ∈
I] = 1. A mixed strategy of supplier i then corresponds to a random variable Xi ∈ RV .
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Throughout the paper we assume that each supplier decides its strategy independently of
the other so that X1 and X2 are independent, and each supplier has enough production
capacity to meet customers’ demands.
Given π1 = X1(ω1) and π2 = X2(ω2) for some ω1, ω2 ∈ Ω, it can be readily seen that
the payoﬀ function of supplier i is given by
hi(π1, π2) =


2
(
πi − c
L + cH
2
)
D if πi < π3−i, πi, π3−i ∈ (cH , U ](
πi − c
L + cH
2
)
D if πi = π3−i, πi, π3−i ∈ (cH , U ]
0 if πi > π3−i, πi, π3−i ∈ (cH , U ]
(cH − cL)D if πi = cH , π3−i ∈ (cH , U ]
(πi − cL)D if πi ∈ (cH , U ], π3−i = cH .
(2.3)
If cH < πi < π3−i ≤ U , supplier i can monopolize the entire market with demand 2D at the
average earning per unit of πi − (cL + cH)/2. When cH < πi = π3−i ≤ U , the demand D
of each customer is split evenly between the two suppliers and the average earning per unit
is again πi − (cL + cH)/2. For the case of cH = πi < π3−i ≤ U , supplier i can capture only
the near customer with average earning per unit of cH − cL. Finally, if cH = π3−i < πi ≤ u,
supplier i is forced to settle for the near customer with the average earning per unit of πi−cL.
Let Si be the strategy set of supplier i and deﬁne S = S1 × S2. In our model, one has
S1 = S2 = RV so that S = RV × RV . Given (X1, X2) ∈ S, let Vi(X1, X2) = E[hi(X1, X2)]
be the expected payoﬀ function of supplier i. More speciﬁcally, we deﬁne
Vi(X1, X2) =
∫ ∫
ω1∈Ω ω2∈Ω
hi(X1(ω1), X2(ω2))P (dω1)P (dω2), i = 1, 2. (2.4)
The following conventional notion in game theory is employed.
Definition 2.1
a) For i = 1, 2, X∗i is a best reply against X3−i if V1(X
∗
1 , X2) = maxX1∈RV [V1(X1, X2)] or
V2(X1, X
∗
2 ) = maxX2∈RV [V2(X1, X2)].
b) For i = 1, 2, Bi(X3−i) = {X∗i : X∗i is a best reply against X3−i} is called the set of best
replies of supplier i against X3−i.
c)The best reply correspondence B : S → S is deﬁned as B(X1, X2) = B1(X2)× B2(X1).
d)(X∗1 , X
∗
2 ) is a Nash equilibrium, denoted by (X
∗
1 , X
∗
2 ) ∈ NE,
if and only if (X∗1 , X
∗
2 ) ∈ B(X∗1 , X∗2 ).
It is diﬃcult to prove the existence of a Nash equilibrium and to construct it explicitly
for this model. In the following sections, we focus on discrete random variables in RV and
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establish a necessary and suﬃcient condition for the existence of a Nash equilibrium. In
addition, when the discrete support points are chosen in such a way that their reciprocals are
separated by equal distance, two types of Nash equilibriums can be constructed explicitly.
Furthermore, it is shown that a sequence of each type of Nash equilibriums converges in law
to a mixed strategy in S as the equal distance diminishes to 0.
3 Nash Equilibrium with Discrete Mixed Strategies
For a given v = [v1, · · · , vL] ∈ RL with v1 = cH < v2 < v3 < · · · vL−1 < vL = U , let DRV (v)
be a set of discrete random variables with full support on {v1, · · · , vL}, where X ∈ DRV (v)
is represented by a probability vector q with P [X = vm] = qm, m ∈ L = {1, 2, 3 · · · , L}, and
we write X ∈ DRV (v) or q ∈ DRV (v) interchangeably. In this section, we focus on discrete
mixed strategies in S(v) = DRV (v) × DRV (v), where Deﬁnition 2.1 should be rewritten
with RV replaced by DRV (v). Let H
i
= [hi(vm, vn)]m,n∈L, i = 1, 2 with hi(vm, vn) as given
in (2.3). From (2.4), one sees that
Vi(q1, q2) = q
T
1
H
i
q
2
, i = 1, 2 . (3.1)
From the symmetric structure of (2.3), it can be seen that h1(π1, π2) = h2(π2, π1) so that
H
2
= HT
1
. It then follows that V2(q1, q2) = q
T
1
H
2
q
2
= qT
2
HT
2
q
1
= qT
2
H
1
q
1
. Hence, it is
possible to deﬁne Vi(q1, q2) in place of (3.1) as
Vi(q1, q2) = q
T
i
H q
3−i , i = 1, 2 , (3.2)
where H
def
= [h1(vm, vn)]m,n∈L = H1 . (3.3)
We next establish a necessary and suﬃcient condition under which a Nash equilibrium exists,
i.e. NE(v) = ø. A preliminary lemma is needed.
Lemma 3.1
Let (q∗
1
, q∗
2
) ∈ NE(v). For i = 1, 2, if (q∗
3−i)mˆ > 0, then (H q
∗
i
)mˆ = maxm∈L[(H q∗i )m].
Proof We prove the lemma by contraposition. Without loss of generality, we assume
that i = 1. Suppose (q∗
2
)mˆ > 0 and (H q
∗
1
)mˆ < maxm∈L[(H q∗1)m]. For m˜ ∈ L satisfying
(H q∗
1
)m˜ = maxm∈L[(H q∗1)m], let q˜
∗
2
be deﬁned by q˜∗
2
= q∗
2
+ (q∗
2
)mˆ(em˜− emˆ) where em ∈ RL
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is the m-th unit vector in RL. It is clear that q˜∗
2
≥ 0 and q˜∗T
2
1 = 1 so that q˜∗
2
∈ DRV (v),
where 1 is a vector whose elements are all 1. It then follows from (3.2) that
V2(q
∗
1
, q˜∗
2
) = q˜∗T
2
H q∗
1
= q∗T
2
H q∗
1
+ (q∗
2
)mˆ(e
T
m˜ − eTmˆ)H q∗1
= V2(q
∗
1
, q∗
2
) + (q∗
2
)mˆ{(H q∗1)m˜ − (H q∗1)mˆ} > V2(q∗1, q∗2)
which contradicts to (q∗
1
, q∗
2
) ∈ NE(v), completing the proof. 
We are now in a position to prove the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 3.2 For q ∈ DRV (v), let (q) = [maxm∈L{(H q)m}]1−H q ≥ 0. Then (q∗1, q∗2) ∈
NE(v) if and only if q∗T
3−i(q
∗
i
) = 0 for i = 1, 2.
Proof Without loss of generality, we assume that i = 1. Suppose (q∗
1
, q∗
2
) ∈ NE(v). From
the deﬁnition of (q), one sees that
((q∗
1
))n = max
m∈L
{(H q∗
1
)m} − (H q∗1)n ≥ 0 for n ∈ L . (3.4)
From Lemma 3.1, if (q∗
2
)n > 0, then maxm∈L{(H q∗1)m} = (H q∗1)n so that ((q∗1))n = 0 from
(3.4). Since q∗
2
≥ 0, one concludes that T (q∗
1
)q∗
2
= 0. Conversely, suppose T (q∗
1
)q∗
2
= 0. It
can be seen from (3.4) that, for ∀q
2
∈ DRV (v), one has H q∗
1
=
[
maxm∈L{(H q∗1)m}
]
1T −
T (q∗
1
). Since q∗T
2
1 = qT
2
1 = 1 and 0 = q∗T
2
(q∗
1
) ≤ qT
2
(q∗
1
), it follows that
V2(q
∗
1
, q∗
2
) = q∗T
2
H q∗
1
= q∗T
2
[max
m∈L
{(H q∗
1
)m}1− (q∗1)]
≥ qT
2
[max
m∈L
{(H q∗
1
)m}1− (q∗1)] = qT2 H q∗1 = V2(q∗1, q2) .
Similarly one has V1(q
∗
1
, q∗
2
) ≥ V1(q1, q∗2) for all q1 ∈ DRV (v). Hence (q∗1, q∗2) ∈ NE(v),
completing the proof. 
While Theorem 3.2 allows one to test whether or not a given (q
1
, q
2
) ∈ S(v) is a Nash
equilibrium, it does not provide a means to construct (q∗
1
, q∗
2
) ∈ NE(v). In the next section,
a constructive proof is given for the existence of a Nash equilibrium by choosing v in a
speciﬁc manner.
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4 Nash Equilibriums with Specific Discrete Support
In this section, we provide a constructive proof for the existence of Nash equilibriums by
choosing v in a certain manner. More speciﬁcally, let a = [a1, · · · , aL]T be such that
a1 =
1
2
(cH − cL)D ; (4.1)
1
am
= (L−m)∆ + 1
aL
, m ∈ L \ {1} ; (4.2)
aL = (U − c
L + cH
2
)D ; and
∆ =
1
a1
− 1
aL
L− 3
2
. (4.3)
It should be noted that a is constructed in such a way that
1
am
− 1
am+1
= ∆ , m ∈ L \ {1, L} ; 1
a1
− 1
a2
=
1
2
∆ . (4.4)
We now deﬁne v = vˆL in terms of a as
vˆL =
1
D
a +
cL + cH
2
1L , (4.5)
where 1m is the m-dimensional vector whose components are all 1. The decomposition of the
interval [cH , U ] by vˆL is rather peculiar as depicted in Figure 4.1. The following proposition
0
1
0 10 20 30
(c
L
+c
H
)
2
 v
7
=U
v
1
=
c
H
Δ
v
6
v
2
a
7
 1
a
1
 1
a
6
 1
Figure 4.1: vˆL with L=7
is straightforward from (4.5) and proof is omitted.
Proposition 4.1 vm+1 − vm is monotonically increasing for m ∈ L \ {L}.
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We next show in a constructive manner that there exist two types of Nash equilibriums
(q∗
1
, q∗
2
), (q∗∗
1
, q∗∗
2
) ∈ NE(vˆL) where the two suppliers oﬀer the same price with the same
expected proﬁt value in the former case, while they oﬀer diﬀerent prices but have the
same expected proﬁt value in the latter case. The ﬁrst step is to prove the existence of
(q∗
1
, q∗
2
) ∈ NE(vˆL). A few preliminary lemmas are needed and proofs are given in Appendix.
Lemma 4.2 Let ∆ be as in (4.3) and deﬁne q∗T = [α1, α21TL−1] ∈ RL where
α1 =
2a1
C1
(
2
aL
−∆), α2 = 2a1
C1
∆, and C1 = 2(
a1
aL
+ 1)− a1∆ . (4.6)
If L > max(2, aL
2a1
+ 1), then q∗ > 0 and q∗T1L = 1.
Lemma 4.3 Let α1, α2 and C1 be as in Lemma 4.2. Then one has a) 2α2+a1(α1−2)∆ = 0
and b) α2 + a1(α1 − 2) 1aL + α1 = 0 .
For notational convenience, the following matrices are introduced. We note that δ{ST} = 1
if the statement ST holds and δ{ST} = 0 else.
I = [δ{i=j}]i,j∈L\{L} ∈ R(L−1)×(L−1) (4.7)
A
D
= [δ{i=j}ai+1]i,j∈L\{L} ∈ R(L−1)×(L−1) (4.8)
L = [δ{i<j}]i,j∈L\{L} ∈ R(L−1)×(L−1) (4.9)
L
1
= [δ{i+1=j}]i,j∈L\{L} ∈ R(L−1)×(L−1) (4.10)
B = I + L ∈ R(L−1)×(L−1) (4.11)
C = I + 2L ∈ R(L−1)×(L−1) (4.12)
w(x, y) = x1L−1 + (y − x)eL−1 ∈ R(L−1), (4.13)
where em ∈ RL−1 is the m-th unit vector in RL−1.
Lemma 4.4 Let A
D
and B be as in (4.8) and (4.11). Then one has a) B−1A−1
D
1L−1 =
w(∆, 1
aL
) and b) B−1C 1L−1 = w(2, 1) .
Lemma 4.5 Let H be as in (3.3) and deﬁne vˆTL = [vˆ1, · · · , vˆL] as in (4.5). Then the
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following statements hold true.
a) [H]1,m = 2a1 for m ∈ L
b) [H ]n,1 = a1 + an for n ∈ L \ {1}
c) [H]m,n = [ADC]m−1,n−1 for m,n ∈ L \ {1}
d) H =
[
2a1 2a11
T
L−1
(a1I + AD)1L−1 ADC
]
e) H
[
x
y1L−1
]
=
[
2a1
(yA
D
C + xa1I + xAD)1L−1
]
where 0 < x < 1, and y = (1− x)/(L− 1)
The main theorem of this section can now be proven.
Theorem 4.6 Let αi(i = 1, 2) be as in (4.6) and deﬁne q
∗
1
= q∗
2
= q∗ where q∗T =
[α1, α21
T
L−1]. If L > max{2, aL2a1 + 1}, then (q∗1, q∗2) ∈ NE(vˆL). Furthermore, the payoﬀ
values of the two suppliers are equal with V1(q
∗
1
, q∗
2
) = V2(q
∗
1
, q∗
2
) = D(cH − cL).
Proof From Lemma 4.2, one sees that q∗ ∈ DRV (vˆL). Let (q) be as in Theorem 3.2.
We will show that (q∗) = 0 so that (q∗)T q∗ = 0. The theorem then follows from Theorem
3.2. From (4.13), one sees that w(x, y) is linear in (x, y). Lemma 4.3 then implies that
α2w(2, 1)+a1(α1−2)w(∆, 1aL )+α1w(0, 1) = w
[
2α2+a1(α1−2)∆, α2+a1(α1−2) 1aL +α1
]
=
w(0, 0) = 0. With w(2, 1) and w(∆, 1
aL
) in the above equation substituted by Lemma 4.4
a) and b) respectively, one sees that α2B
−1C 1L−1 + a1(α1− 2)B−1A−1D 1L−1 +α1w(0, 1) = 0
Multiplying A
D
B from left, this then leads to
α2ADBB
−1C 1L−1 + a1(α1 − 2)1L−1 + α1ADB w(0, 1) = 0 ,
i.e. [
α2ADC + a1α1I + α1AD
]
1L−1 = 2a11L−1 , (4.14)
where Bw(0, 1) = 1L−1 is employed to yield (4.14). On the other hand, from Lemma 4.5
d), one sees that H q∗ =
[
2a1
(α2ADC + α1a1I + α1AD)1L−1
]
. It then follows from this and
(4.14) that H q∗ = 2a11L. This in turn implies that (q
∗) = [maxm∈L{(H q∗)m}]1L−H q∗ =
2a11L − 2a11L = 0 , completing the proof. 
The above theorem states that a Nash equilibrium can be achieved when the two
suppliers oﬀer the same mixed strategy q∗T = [α1, α21T ] ∈ DRV (vˆL). As can be seen from
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(4.3), ∆ decreases as L increases. One then sees from (4.6) that α1 is much larger than α2
for large values of L. In this case, the two suppliers tend to protect the near customer by
assigning a higher probability of α1 to vˆ1 = c
H . At the same time, it is crucial to allocate a
small but positive probability α2 to all other price alternatives so that (q
∗, q∗) ∈ NE(vˆL) can
be assured. Somewhat surprisingly, we next show that there exists a diﬀerent type of Nash
equilibrium (q∗∗
1
, q∗∗
2
) ∈ NE(vˆL), where the two suppliers take diﬀerent mixed strategies but
share the same expected payoﬀ which is the same as that of Theorem 4.6. As before, a few
preliminary lemmas are needed and proofs are given in Appendix.
Lemma 4.7 Let α3 and α4 be deﬁned by
α3 =
2
aL
1
a1
+ 1
aL
, and α4 =
2∆
1
a1
+ 1
aL
. (4.15)
Then one has a)α3 = a1(2− α3) 1aL and b)α4 = a1(2− α3)∆ .
In what follows, the matrices in (4.7) through (4.12) are employed.
Lemma 4.8 Let H be as in (3.3) and deﬁne vˆL as in (4.5). We also deﬁne f ∈ RL−1
as (f)m = {1 + (−1)m}/2, m ∈ L \ {L}. If L is even, then for any 0 < x < 1 and
y = 2(1− x)/(L− 2), one has
H
[
x
yf
]
=
[
2a1
yA
D
C f + xa11 + xAD1
]
. (4.16)
Lemma 4.9 Let H, vˆL and w(x, y) be as in (3.3),(4.5) and (4.13) respectively. Then for
any 0 < y < 1 and x = (1− y)/(L− 2), one has
H
[
0
w(x, y)
]
=
[
2a1
A
D
C w(x, y)
]
.
Lemma 4.10 Let f be as in Lemma 4.8. If L is even, then one has a) B−1C f = w(1, 0)
and b) B−11 = w(0, 1).
We are now in a position to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.11 Let α3 and α4 be as in Lemma 4.7. For f ∈ RL−1 given in Lemma 4.8, we
deﬁne (q∗∗1 , q
∗∗
2 ) as q
∗∗
i
T = 4
4−α4 [α3, α4f
T ] , q∗∗
3−i
T = [0, wT (α5, α6)]
where α5 = a1∆ and α6 = a1(
1
aL
+
∆
2
) . (4.17)
If L is even and L > max(2, aL
2a1
+ 1), then (q∗∗1 , q
∗∗
2 ) ∈ NE(vˆL). The payoﬀ values of the
two suppliers at this equilibrium are equal with V1(q
∗∗
1 , q
∗∗
2 ) = V2(q
∗∗
1 , q
∗∗
2 ) = D(c
H − cL).
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Proof Without loss of generality we assume i = 1. First we show that q∗∗
1
, q∗∗
2
∈ DRV (vˆL).
It can be seen from (4.15) that α3 +
L−2
2
α4 = (α3 +
L− 3
2
2
α4) − 14α4 = 1 − 14α4, so that
q∗∗T
1
1 = 4
4−α4 (α3 + α4f
T1L−1) =
1
1− 1
4
α4
(α3 +
L−2
2
α4) = 1. From (4.13) and the deﬁnition of
q∗∗2 , one sees that q
∗∗T
2 1 = w
T (α5, α6)1L−1 = (L − 1)α5 + (α6 − α5) = (L − 2)α5 + α6 . It
then follows from (4.3) and (4.17) that q∗∗T2 1 = (L − 32)a1∆ + a1aL = ( 1a1 − 1aL )a1 + a1aL = 1 .
One sees from (4.3), (4.15) and the condition L > max{2, aL
2a1
+ 1} that
α4 =
2∆
1
a1
+ 1
aL
=
2
L− 3
2
aL − a1
aL + a1
<
2
aL
2a1
+ 1− 3
2
aL − a1
aL + a1
=
4a1
aL − a1
aL − a1
aL + a1
= 4
1
1 + aL
a1
< 4 .
Hence q∗∗
i
≥ 0, i = 1, 2 and q∗∗1 , q∗∗2 ∈ DRV (vˆL). We next show that T (q∗∗1 )q∗∗2 = 0.
From Lemma 4.10 together with (4.13), one easily sees that α4B
−1C f + α3B−11L−1 =
α4w(1, 0) + α3w(0, 1) = w(α4, α3) . By Lemma 4.7 this then leads to
α4B
−1C f + α3B−11L−1 = a1(2− α3)w(∆,
1
aL
) = a1(2− α3)B−1A−1D 1L−1 ,
where Lemma 4.4 a) is employed to yield the last equality. By multiplying A
D
B from left
to the above equation, it follows that α4ADC f + α3AD 1L−1 = a1(2−α3)1L−1, and one has
α4ADC f + α3AD1L−1 + α3a11L−1 = 2a11L−1 . (4.18)
Let x = 4α3
4−α4 and y =
4α4
4−α4 . One sees that (L − 2)(4 − α4)y = (L − 32 − 12)4 2∆1a1+ 1aL =
8
1
a1
− 1
aL
1
a1
+ 1
aL
−2 2∆1
a1
+ 1
aL
= 8−8
2
aL
1
a1
+ 1
aL
−2α4 = 8−8α3−2α4 = 2(4−α4)(1−x), so that y = 2(1−x)L−2 .
Since qT∗∗
1
∈ DRV (vˆL) and the ﬁrst component of qT∗∗1 is x, one has 0 < x < 1. Applying
these x and y to Lemma 4.8 and using (4.18), one sees that H q∗∗
1
=
[
2a1
4
4−α42a11L−1
]
.
Substituting this into the deﬁnition of (q∗∗
1
) yields (q∗∗
1
)T = maxm(H q
∗∗
1
)m1
T − (H q∗∗
1
)T =
4
4−α42a11
T
L − [2a1, 44−α42a11TL−1] = [ α44−α42a1, 0TL−1] . This in turn implies that (q∗∗1 )T q∗∗2 =
( α4
4−α42a1, 0
T
L−1)[0, w(α5, α6)]
T = 0. We also need to show (q∗∗
2
)T q∗∗
1
= 0. From (4.17)
together with (4.13), one sees that
α5w(2, 1) + w(0, 2(α6 − α5)) = w(2α5, 2α6 − α5) = 2a1w(∆, 1
aL
) . (4.19)
Since B−1(C + I) = (I + L)−1(I + 2L + I) = 2I , using Lemma 4.4 a) b), (4.19) leads to
α5B
−1C 1L−1 + B
−1 (C + I)w(0, α6 − α5) = 2a1B−1A−1D 1L−1 . (4.20)
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Multiplying A
D
B from left in (4.20), one obtains α5 ADC 1L−1+AD (C+I)w(0, α6−α5) =
2a11L−1 . From the linearity of w(x, y) in (4.13) and (4.8), this then leads to
A
D
C w(α5, α6) + w(0, aL(α6 − α5))
= A
D
C w(α5, α5) + AD C w(0, α6 − α5) + w(0, aL(α6 − α5))
= A
D
C w(α5, α5) + AD C w(0, α6 − α5) + AD w(0, (α6 − α5))
= α5 ADC 1L−1 + AD (C + I)w(0, α6 − α5) = 2a11L−1 ,
that is,
A
D
C w(α5, α6) = 2a11L−1 − w(0, aL(α6 − α5)) . (4.21)
Let x = α5 and y = α6, then one has x(L − 2) = a1∆(L − 2) = a1∆(L − 32 − 12) =
(1− a1
aL
)− a1 ∆2 = 1− α6 = 1− y, so that x = (1− y)/(L− 2). From (4.17) with (4.3) and
the condition L > 2, one has
y = α6 = a1(
1
aL
+
∆
2
) =
a1
aL
+
a1
2
1
a1
− 1
aL
L− 3
2
<
a1
aL
+
1− a1
aL
2(2− 3
2
)
= 1 .
Hence with x and y above, Lemma 4.9 can be applied, yielding
H q∗∗
2
= H
[
0
w(α5, α6)
]
=
[
2a1
A
D
C w(α5, α6)
]
=
[
2a1
2a11L−1 − w(0, aL(α6 − α5))
]
.
It should be noted that from the condition L >
aL
2a1
+ 1, one has α6 − α5 = a1aL − a1∆2 =
a1
aL
− 1−
a1
aL
2(L− 3
2
)
> a1
aL
− 1−
a1
aL
2(
aL
2a1
+1− 3
2
)
= a1
aL
− 1−
a1
aL
aL
a1
−1 = 0, so that maxm{(H q∗∗2 )m} = 2a1. Thus we
obtain
q∗∗T
1
(q∗∗
2
) = q∗∗T
1
[
max
m
{(H q∗∗
2
)m}1L −H q∗∗2
]
= q∗∗T
1
[
2a11L −
[
2a1
2a11L−1 − w(0, aL(α6 − α5))
]]
=
4
4− α4 [α3, α4f
T ]
[
0
w(0, aL(α6 − α5))
]
.
Since w(0, aL(α6 − α5)) = [0, · · · , 0, aL(α6 − α5)]T from (4.13), and the last component of
fT as deﬁned in Lemma 4.8 is 0 when L is even, one then concludes that εT (q∗∗
2
)q∗∗
1
= 0.
The theorem now follows from Theorem 3.2. 
It should be noted that the strategies of the two suppliers at Nash equilibrium in Theorem
4.11 can be written as q∗∗T
1
= 4
4−α4
[
α3, α4f
T
]
and q∗∗T
2
= [0, α5, · · · , α5, α6] while those in
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Theorem 4.6 are q∗T
1
= q∗T
2
=
[
α1, α21
T
L−1
]
. As we will see, one has limL→∞ q∗1 = limL→∞ q
∗∗
1
,
while limL→∞ q∗∗2 is quite diﬀerent. The supplier with q
∗∗
1
is risk-aversive with tendency
to protect the near customer by oﬀering lower prices with higher probabilities, while the
supplier with q∗∗
2
is risk-taking, by oﬀering higher prices with higher probabilities.
5 Limit Theorems of Nash Equilibriums with Specific
Discrete Support
In the previous section, two Nash equilibriums (q∗1, q
∗
2) and (q
∗∗
1 , q
∗∗
2 ) are constructed explic-
itly, when the strategy set consists of L discrete supporting points for pricing with vˆL =
[vˆL:1, · · · , vˆL:L] as given in (4.5). While vˆL partitions the strategy set I = [cH , U ] of the origi-
nal problem in a rather peculiar way as shown in Figure 4.1, the set {vˆL : L = L0, L0+1, · · · }
with L0 > 2 becomes dense in I = [c
H , U ] as we will see. It is then of interest to see whether
or not (X∗1 (L), X
∗
2 (L)) and (X
∗∗
1 (L), X
∗∗
2 (L)) in S(vˆL) = DRV (vˆL)×DRV (vˆL) converge to
any mixed strategies (X∗1 , X
∗
2 ) and (X
∗∗
1 , X
∗∗
2 ) in S = RV × RV of the original problem as
L →∞, where X∗i (L) and X∗∗i (L) are discrete random variables associated with q∗i and q∗∗i
respectively, i = 1, 2.
In order to understand such limiting behaviors, we ﬁrst deﬁne the partition of I =
[cH , U ] based on vˆL = [vˆL:1, · · · , vˆL:L] as PT (vˆL) = {[vˆL:m, vˆL:m+1) : m = 1, 2, · · · , L − 1}.
The partition of I = [cH , U ] with N intervals of equal distance is deﬁned similarly as
PT (uN) = {[uN ;r, uN :r+1) : r = 1, 2, · · · , N − 1}, where uN = [uN :1, · · · , uN :N ]; uN :r =
cH + (r−1)(U−c
H )
N−1 , 1 ≤ r ≤ N. For later use, we also deﬁne
τN = [τN :1, · · · , τN :N ] = D
(
uN −
cL + cH
2
1N
)
. (5.1)
From (4.5) and (5.1), it should be noted that
uN =
1
D
τN +
cL + cH
2
1N ; and vˆL =
1
D
a +
cL + cH
2
1L . (5.2)
Hence the basic question to be answered is how many components of vˆL are contained in
each interval of PT (uN), and the limit of the result as L →∞. For describing this problem
more precisely, the following notation and deﬁnitions are introduced.
Definition 5.1 Let aL = [aL:1, · · · , aL:L]T be as in (4.1) through (4.3) where the index L is
attached to emphasize aL ∈ RL. Then we deﬁne a)K = 1aL:1− 1aL:L and b)∆(L) = 1L− 32 K.
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From (4.2), one sees that 1
aL:m
= (L−m)∆(L) + 1
aL:L
for m ∈ L \ {1}. This then implies
aL:m =
aL:L
(L−m)∆(L)aL:L + 1 for m ∈ L \ {1} . (5.3)
We also note from (4.4) that
1
aL:1
− 1
aL:2
=
1
2
∆(L),
1
aL:m
− 1
aL:m+1
= ∆(L) for m ∈ L \ {1, L} . (5.4)
It can be readily seen from Deﬁnition 5.1 b) that
lim
L→∞
L∆(L) = K . (5.5)
Definition 5.2 For 1 ≤ r ≤ N − 1, we deﬁne:
J(r, L,N) = {m : vˆL:m ∈ [uN :r, uN :r+1)}; (5.6)
Z(r, L,N) = |J(r, L,N)|; (5.7)
mmin(r, L,N) = min{m : m ∈ J(r, L,N)}; (5.8)
mmax(r, L,N) = max{m : m ∈ J(r, L,N)}; (5.9)
min(r, L,N) = vˆL:mmin(r,L,N) − uN :r ; and (5.10)
max(r, L,N) = uN :r+1 − vˆL:mmax(r,L,N) . (5.11)
 
ε 
min(r,L,N) 
ε 
max(r,L,N) 
u
r
 u
r+1
 
min(r,L,N) 
v 
max(r,L,N) 
v 
Figure 5.1: The r-th Interval Generated by PT (uN)
As can be seen in Figure 5.1, given PT (vˆL) and PT (uL), J(r, L,N) is the index set for
the components of vˆL contained in the r-th interval generated by PT (uL), and Z(r, L,N)
is the cardinality of J(r, L,N). Since each interval generated by PT (uL) is deﬁned as a
left-closed and right-open interval, the last point vˆL = U = uN :N never belongs to any
interval. Accordingly, the qustion to be answered is to ﬁnd Z(r, L,N)/(L − 1) and its
limiting behavior as L → ∞. Before proving this, we ﬁrst show that, given PT (uN), one
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can make each interval in PT (uN) contain an arbitrary number of components of vˆL by
taking L suﬃciently large.
Proposition 5.3 Let N0 and N be any positive intergers greater than or equal to 2. Then
there exists a positive integer L(N0, N) such that for any L > L(N0, N), one has Z(r, L,N) ≥
N0 for all r = 1, · · · , N − 1.
Proof From (5.2) and (5.4) together with Proposition 4.1, one sees that max1≤m<L{vˆL:m+1−
vˆL:m} = vˆL:L− vˆL:L−1 = aL:LaL:L−1D
(
1
aL:L−1
− 1
aL:L
)
<
a2L:L
D
∆(L) = D
(
U − cL+cH
2
)2
∆(L) . Since
∆(L) → 0 as L →∞ from Deﬁnition 5.1 b), this then implies that
max
1≤m<L
{vˆL:m+1 − vˆL:m} = vˆL:L − vˆL:L−1 → 0 as L →∞ . (5.12)
Consequently, for any  > 0, there exists a positive integer L() such that, for any L > L(),
one has |vˆL:m+1 − vˆL:m| <  for all m = 1, · · · , L− 1. For given N0 and N , choose (N0, N)
so that 0 < (N0, N) < (U − cH)/(N0(N − 1)). Then for any L > L(N0, N) = L((N0, N)),
one has Z(r, L,N) ≥ N0, completing the proof. 
In what follows, we assume that L > L(N0, N) for some N0 ≥ 2. Three more lemmas
are needed before proving the ﬁrst main theorem of this section and proofs are given in
Appendix.
Lemma 5.4 For 1 ≤ r ≤ N − 1, one has
lim
L→∞
max(r, L,N) = 0 and lim
L→∞
min(r, L,N) = 0 .
In what follows, the arguments r, L and N are omitted whenever there is no ambiguity.
Lemma 5.5 Let L(N0, N) be as in Proposition 5.3. Then the following equations hold for
all L > L(N0, N).
a) mmin(1, L,N) = 1; and (5.13)
mmin(r, L,N) = L− 1
∆(L)
(
1
τN :r + Dmin(r, L,N)
− 1
aL:L
)
for 2 ≤ r ≤ N − 1 (5.14)
b) mmax(r, L,N) = L− 1
∆(L)
(
1
τN :r+1 −Dmax(r, L,N) −
1
aL:L
)
for 1 ≤ r ≤ N − 1 (5.15)
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Lemma 5.6 Let L(N0, N) be as in Proposition 5.3. Then for all L > L(N0, N), one has:
Z(1, L,N) = L− 1
∆(L)
(
1
τN :2 −Dmax(1, L,N) −
1
aL:L
)
and (5.16)
Z(r, L,N) =
1
∆(L)
(
1
τN :r −Dmax(r − 1, L,N) −
1
τN :r+1 −Dmax(r, L,N)
)
, 2 ≤ r ≤ N − 1 .
(5.17)
We are now in a position to prove the ﬁrst main theorem of this section.
Theorem 5.7 Let g(r, L,N) be deﬁned by
g(r, L,N) =
Z(r, L,N)
L− 1 for all 1 ≤ r ≤ N − 1 . (5.18)
One then has, for 1 ≤ r ≤ N − 1,
g(r,N)
def
= lim
L→∞
g(r, L,N) =
1
K
(
1
τN :r
− 1
τN :r+1
)
, (5.19)
where τN :r and K are as given in (5.1) and Deﬁnition 5.1 a) respectively.
Proof Form Lemma 5.6, one sees that Z(1,L,N)
L−1 =
L
L−1
{
1− 1
L∆(L)
(
1
τN:2−Dmax(1,L,N) − 1aL:L
)}
.
By letting L →∞, it then follows from Lemma 5.4 and (5.5) that g(1, N) = 1
K
(
K − 1
τN:2
+ 1
aL:L
)
.
From Deﬁnition 5.1 a) and noting τN :1 = aL:1, this then leads to g(1, N) =
1
K
(
1
τN:1
− 1
τN:2
)
.
For 2 ≤ r ≤ N − 1, the theorem follows similarly. 
From Theorem 5.7, one realizes that
∑N−1
r=1 g(r,N) =
1
K
( 1
τN:1
− 1
τN:2
+ 1
τN:2
− 1
τN:3
+
· · · + 1
τN:N−1
− 1
τN:N
) = 1
K
( 1
τN:1
− 1
τN:N
) = 1
K
( 1
aL:1
− 1
aL:L
) = K
K
= 1. Since g(r,N) > 0 for
1 ≤ r ≤ N − 1, one can associate {g(r,N)}N−1r=1 with a random variable in the following
manner. Let X(L) ∈ DRV (vˆL) having a probability vector qL = [qL:1, · · · , qL:L] given by
qT
L
=
1
(L− 1)[0, 1
T
L−1] ∈ RL . (5.20)
Since qL:m = P [X(L) = vˆm] = 1/(L − 1) for 2 ≤ m ≤ L, one sees from (5.18) that
g(1, L,N) = P [uN :1 ≤ X(L) < uN :2] + 1L−1 , and for 2 ≤ r ≤ L − 1 g(r, L,N) = P [uN :r ≤
X(L) < uN :r+1]. Consequently, it follows for 1 ≤ r ≤ L− 1 that
g(r,N) = lim
L→∞
P [uN :r ≤ X(L) < ur+1] . (5.21)
Based on (5.21), it is possible to identify the limiting distribution of X(L). More specif-
ically, let X(∞) be a random variable satisfying X(L) d→ X(∞) where “ d→” denotes the
convergence in law, i.e. , if one deﬁnes
FL(x) = P [X(L) ≤ x]; F∞(x) = P [X(∞) ≤ x], x ∈ R , (5.22)
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then limL→∞ FL(x) = F∞(x) for all continuity points x ∈ R of F∞(x). Of interest is then
to ﬁnd F∞(x). A preliminary lemma is needed.
Lemma 5.8 For I = [cH , U ] in (2.1), let S = U − cH . Then, for any  > 0, there exists a
positive integer N() such that one has, for all N > N(),∣∣∣∣g(r,N)S
N−1
− D
Kτ 2N :r+1
∣∣∣∣ <  , r ∈ N \ {N} . (5.23)
Proof It should be noted from (5.1) that τN :r+1 − τN :r = D(uN :r+1 − uN :r) = DS/(N −
1), r ∈ N \ {N}. Using this and (5.19), one sees that∣∣∣∣g(r,N)S
N−1
− D
Kτ 2N :r+1
∣∣∣∣ = 1K
∣∣∣∣N − 1S
(
1
τN :r
− 1
τN :r+1
)
− D
τ 2N :r+1
∣∣∣∣
=
1
K
∣∣∣∣ DτN :rτN :r+1 −
D
τ 2N :r+1
∣∣∣∣ = DK
∣∣∣∣τN :r+1 − τN :rτN :rτ 2N :r+1
∣∣∣∣ ≤ DK DS(N − 1) 1τ 3N :1 . (5.24)
where τN :r ≥ τN :1, r ∈ N is employed to yield the last inequality. The right most side of
(5.24) does not depend on r. With [z] being the smallest integer which is greater than or
equal to z, let
N() =
[
D2S
Kτ3N :1
]
+ 1 , (5.25)
which is independent of r. Inequality (5.23) then holds for all r ∈ N \ {N}, completing the
proof. 
Now we give the proof of the main theorem of this section.
Theorem 5.9 Let X(L) and X(∞) be as given in (5.22). Then X(∞) is absolutely con-
tinuous with probability density function f∞(x) = ddxF∞(x) given by
f∞(x) =
{
1
KD
(
x− cL+cH
2
)−2
, x ∈ I = [cH , U ]
0 , else
. (5.26)
Proof Let r˜(x,N) = argmin1≤r≤N−1{x < uN :r+1}, so that x ∈ [uN :r˜(x,N), uN :r˜(x,N)+1).
It then follows that
Pr{X(L) < x} ≤ Pr{X(L) < uN :r˜(x,N)+1} =
r˜(x,N)∑
r=1
Pr{uN :r ≤ X(L) < uN :r+1} (5.27)
and, for r˜(x,N) ≥ 2,
Pr{X(L) < x} ≥ Pr{X(L) < uN :r˜(x,N)} =
r˜(x,N)−1∑
r=1
Pr{uN :r ≤ X(L) < uN :r+1} . (5.28)
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For suﬃciently large N , one has r˜(x,N) ≥ 2. Combining (5.27) and (5.28) with (5.21), one
has
r˜(x,N)−1∑
r=1
g(r,N) ≤ lim
L→∞
r˜(x,N)−1∑
r=1
Pr{uN :r ≤ X(L) < uN :r+1} ≤ lim
L→∞
Pr{X(L) < x}
≤ lim
L→∞
r˜(x,N)∑
r=1
Pr{uN :r ≤ X(L) < uN :r+1} ≤
r˜(x,N)∑
r=1
g(r,N) .(5.29)
From (5.19), one sees that limN→∞ g(r,N) = 0 for 1 ≤ r ≤ N − 1 and this convergence is
uniform in terms of r. This then leads to limN→∞ g(r˜(x,N), N) = 0 for cH ≤ x ≤ U . Hence
one has
lim
N→∞
r˜(x,N)∑
r=1
g(r,N) = lim
N→∞
r˜(x,N)∑
r=1
g(r,N)− lim
N→∞
g(r˜(x,N), N) = lim
N→∞
r˜(x,N)−1∑
r=1
g(r,N) .(5.30)
From (5.29), this then implies that
lim
N→∞
r˜(x,N)∑
r=1
g(r,N) = lim
L→∞
Pr{X(L) < x} . (5.31)
Let f∞(x) be as in (5.26). Then it should be noted that, for all x ∈ [cH , U ],
r˜(x,N)∑
r=1
g(r,N)
can be expressed as
r˜(x,N)∑
r=1
g(r,N) =
S
N − 1
r˜(x,N)∑
r=1
[
g(r,N)
S
N−1
− f∞(uN :r+1)
]
+
[r˜(x,N)∑
r=1
f∞(uN :r+1)
S
N − 1 −
∫ x
cH
f∞(y)dy
]
+
∫ x
cH
f∞(y)dy . (5.32)
From (5.1) and (5.26) one sees that
f∞(uN :r+1) =
D
KD2
(
uN :r+1 − c
L + cL
2
)−2
=
D
Kτ 2N :r+1
. (5.33)
For any  > 0, let N() be as in (5.25). From Lemma 5.8, it follows that, for all N > N(),
S
N − 1
r˜(x,N)∑
r=1
∣∣∣∣g(r,N)S
N−1
− f∞(uN :r+1)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ SN − 1
r˜(x,N)∑
r=1
 =
Sr˜(x,N)
N − 1  ≤ S . (5.34)
Hence the ﬁrst term of (5.32) goes to 0 as N →∞. Since f∞(x) in (5.26) is absolutely con-
tinuos on [cH , U ], the second term of (5.32) also goes to 0 as N →∞. Combining these ob-
servations with (5.32), one ﬁnally concludes that limN→∞
∑r˜(x,N)
r=1 g(r,N) =
∫ x
cH
f∞(y)dy ,
and the theorem follows from (5.31). 
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Theorem 5.9 states that X(L) speciﬁed by probability vector q
L
in (5.20) converges in
law to X(∞) as L →∞ where X(∞) is absolutely continuous with probability density func-
tion f∞(x) given in (5.26). Using this theorem, we next show that both (X∗1 (L), X
∗
2 (L)) ∈
NE(vˆL) of Theorem 4.6 and (X∗∗1 (L), X∗∗2 (L)) ∈ NE(vˆL) of Theorem 4.11 deﬁned on
S(vˆL) = DRV (vˆL) × DRV (vˆL) converge in law to (X∗1 , X∗2 ) and (X∗∗1 , X∗∗2 ) deﬁned on
S = RV ×RV respectively as L →∞.
Theorem 5.10 Let X∗(L) = X∗1 (L) = X
∗
2 (L) ∈ DRV (vˆL) be associated with q∗ = q∗1 = q∗2
as in Theorem 4.6 and deﬁne B(p) as a Bernoulli random variable with P [B(p) = 1] = p
for 0 < p < 1. Then, one has
X∗(L) d→ B
( 2a1
a1 + aL
)
cH +
(
1−B
( 2a1
a1 + aL
))
X(∞) ∈ RV (5.35)
as L →∞, where X(∞) is as in Theorem 5.9, and B( 2a1
a1+aL
) is independent of X(∞).
Proof From Lemma 4.2, one has (L − 1)α2 + α1 = 1, so that q∗T = [α1, α21TL−1] =
α1[1, o
T
L−1] + (1− α1)[0, 1L−11TL−1]. This then implies that X∗(L) can be written as
X∗(L) = B(α1)cH + (1−B(α1))X(L) , (5.36)
where B(α1) is independent of X(L). The theorem then follows sinc α1 → 2a1a1+aL as L →∞
from (4.3) and (4.6). 
Next we prove the limit thoerem of the equilibrium (X∗∗1 (L), X
∗∗
2 (L)) given by Theorem
4.11 as L →∞.
Theorem 5.11 Let B(p) be as in Theorem 5.10 and let X ′(L) be the random variable
represented by probability vector q
′T
L
def
= 2
L−2 [0, f
T ] where f is as in Lemma 4.8. For i = 1, 2,
let X∗∗1 (L) and X
∗∗
2 (L) be the random variables associated with q
∗∗
1
and q∗∗
2
given in Theorem
4.11 respectively. Then, for i = 1, 2, one has
X∗∗i (L)
d→ B
( 2a1
a1 + aL
)
cH +
(
1−B
( 2a1
a1 + aL
))
X(∞) ∈ RV ; and (5.37)
X∗∗3−i(L)
d→ B
( a1
aL
)
U +
(
1− B
( a1
aL
))
X(∞) ∈ RV (5.38)
as L →∞, where X(∞) is as in Theorem 5.9, and B( 2a1
a1+aL
) and B( a1
aL
) are independent of
X(∞) respectively.
20
Proof Without loss of generality we assume i = 1. Since q∗∗T
1
1L = 1, one has
4α3
4−α4 +
4(L−2)α4
4−α4 = 1, so that q
∗∗T
1
= 4
4−α4 [α3, α4f
T ] = 4α3
4−α4 [1, 0
T
L−1] +
4α4
4−α4 [0, f
T ] = 4α3
4−α4 [1, 0
T
L−1] +
(1− 4α3
4−α4 )[0,
1
L−2f
T ]. This then implies that X∗∗1 (L) can be written as
X∗∗1 (L) = B
( 4α3
4− α4
)
cH+
(
1− B
( 4α3
4− α4
))
X ′(L) , (5.39)
where B( 4α3
4−α4 ) is independent of X
′(L). Similarly, since q∗∗T
2
1L = 1 one has (L − 2)α5 +
α6 = 1, so that q
∗∗T
2
= [0, wT (α5, α6)] = [0, w
T (α5, α5)] + [0, w
T (0, α6 − α5)] = {1 − (α6 −
α5)}[0, 1L−11L−1] + (α6 − α5)[0, wT (0, 1)]. Hence X∗∗2 (L) can be written as
X∗∗2 (L) = (1− B(α6 − α5))X(L) + B(α6 − α5) U , (5.40)
where B(α6 − α5) are also independent of X(L). Since ‖q′L − qL‖2 → 0 as L →∞, one has
X ′(L) d→ X(∞) as L → ∞. The theorem then follows since 4α3
4−α4 and α6 − α5 go to 2a1a1+aL
and a1
aL
as L →∞ respectively from (4.4), (4.15) and (4.17). 
It is worth noting that the limit of X∗(L) in Theorem 5.10 has the mass m(cH) =
2a1/(a1 + aL) at c
H . Let U = cH + d. From (4.1) and (4.2), one then sees that
m(cH) =
cH − cL
cH − cL + d . (5.41)
Adopting the lowest possible price at cH is the risk aversive strategy in that the supplier
secures the near customer while giving up the distant customer. Equation (5.41) states that
the mass assigned to this strategy at the limit is the ratio of the unit proﬁt expected from
the near customer under this strategy against that obtained by oﬀering the highest possible
price U = cH + d. Clearly, the mass m(cH) vanishes as U → ∞ and the associated lim-
iting distribution becomes absolutely continuous on [cH ,∞) having the probability density
function given by
f∞:U=∞(x) =
cH − cL
2
(
x− c
L + cH
2
)−2
. (5.42)
The interpretation for Theorem 5.11 can be stated as supplier i takes the risk aversive
strategy by placing the mass mi(c
H) as given in (5.41), while supplier 3− i adopts the risk
taking strategy by placing the mass m3−i(U) at the highest possible price U where
m3−i(U) =
cH − cL
cH − cL + 2d . (5.43)
Both mi(c
H) and m3−i(U) diminish to zero as U → ∞ and one observes again that both
suppliers have the same associated limiting strategy speciﬁed by (5.42). One may then
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expect that there exists the unique Nash equilibrium speciﬁed by (5.42) with the strategy
space S = RV × RV where RV is the set of all random variables deﬁned on [cH ,∞). This
conjecture is currently under study and will be reported elsewhere.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 4.2: Since L > 2, one has 0 < 2
aL
(L− 1) + 2
a1
(L− 2) = 2( 1
aL
+ 1
a1
)(L−
3
2
) −
(
1
a1
− 1
aL
)
=
L− 3
2
a1
[
2( a1
aL
+ 1) − a1∆
]
=
L− 3
2
a1
C1, so that C1 > 0. Similarly, since
L >
aL
2a1
+ 1, it can be seen that 2
aL
− ∆ = 2
aL
−
1
a1
− 1
aL
(L− 3
2
)
= 1
L− 3
2
{
1
aL
(2L − 3) − 1
a1
+ 1
aL
}
=
1
L− 3
2
{
2
aL
(L − 1) − 1
a1
}
= 2
aL(L− 32 )
(
L − 1 − aL
2a1
)
> 0. It then follows that α1 > 0 and
α2 > 0. Furthermore, one has q
∗T1L = α1 + (L − 1)α2 = 2a1C1
{
2
aL
− ∆ + (L − 1)∆
}
=
2a1
C1
{
2
aL
− ∆
2
+ (L− 3
2
)∆
}
= 2a1
C1
{
2
aL
− ∆
2
+ 1
a1
− 1
aL
}
= 1
C1
(
2a1
aL
+ 2− a1∆
)
= 1.
Proof of Lemma 4.3: From the deﬁnition of ∆, α1, α2 and C1, one sees that 2α2+a1(α1−
2)∆ = 2a1
C1
[
2∆ + C1
2
{
2a1
C1
(
2
aL
− ∆
)
− 2
}
∆
]
= 2a1
C1
∆
(
2 + 2a1
aL
− a1∆ − C1
)
. Substituting
−a1∆ = C1− 2a1aL − 2 into the last term then yields 2a1C1 ∆
(
2+ 2a1
aL
+C1− 2a1aL − 2−C1
)
= 0 ,
proving a). For part b), we ﬁrst note from a) and the deﬁnition of α2 that a1(α1 − 2) =
−2α2
∆
= −4α1
C1
. We also note that α1 + α2 =
2a1
C1
( 2
aL
−∆ + ∆) = 4a1
C1
1
aL
. It then follows that
α2 + a1(α1 − 2) 1aL + α1 = −4α1C1 1aL + 4α1C1 1aL = 0 , completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.4: We ﬁrst note that L − L
1
= L
1
L so that (I − L
1
)B = I − L
1
+
L− L
1
L = I, and hence B−1 = I − L
1
. From (4.4)(4.8) and (4.10), one then sees that
B−1A−1
D
1L−1 = (I − L1)A−1D 1L−1 = A−1D 1L−1 − L1A−1D 1L−1
=


1
a2
1
a3
. . .
0
0
1
aL−1
1
aL




1
1
1
...
1

−


0
0
0
0
1
a3
1
a4
. . .
1
aL
0 0 0 . . . 0




1
1
1
...
1


=


1
a2
1
a3
...
1
aL−1
1
aL


−


1
a3
1
a4
...
1
aL
0

 =


∆
∆
...
∆
1
aL

 = ∆1L−1 +
(
1
aL
−∆
)
eL−1 ,
where ∆ is as in (4.3), proving a). For part b), since B−1 = I − L
1
and (I − L
1
)L = L
1
,
it can be seen that B−1C 1L−1 = (I − L1)(I + 2L)1L−1 = {(I − L1) + (2L− 2L1L)}1L−1 =
I 1L−1 + L11L−1 = w(1, 1) + w(1, 0) = w(2, 1) where I 1L−1 = w(1, 1) and L11L−1 = w(1, 0)
are employed to yield the last eauality, proving the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 4.5: In what follows, since H = H
1
as in (3.3), any reference to (2.3)
assumes i = 1. We ﬁrst note from (4.1) and (4.5) that vˆ1 =
a1
D
+ c
L+cH
2
= c
H−cL
2
+ c
L+cH
2
= cH .
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Hence from (2.3) and (4.1), one has [H]1,m = h1(vˆ1, vˆm) = h1(c
H , vˆm) = (c
H − cL)D = 2a1,
proving a). For part b), one sees from (2.3) that [H ]n,1 = h1(vˆn, vˆ1) = h1(vˆn, c
H) = (vˆn −
cL)D. Substituting vˆn =
an
D
+ c
L+cH
2
from (4.5) into the last term and using (4.1), we obtain
(vˆn − cL)D = an + cH−cL2 D = an + a1. In order to prove part c), we consider the following
three cases:
Case:1 1 < m < n ≤ L
For this case, one has vˆm < vˆn from (4.4) and (4.5) so that it follows from (2.3) that
[H ]m,n = h(vˆm, vˆn) = 2(vˆm − cL+cH2 )D = 2(amD + c
L+cH
2
− cL+cH
2
)D = 2am .
Case:2 m = n ≤ L
Similarly, for m = n, one has [H]m,n = h(vˆm, vˆn) = (vˆm − cL+cH2 )D = am for m ∈ L \ {1}.
Case:3 L ≥ m > n > 1
In this case, one has vˆm > vˆn and from (2.3) [H ]m,n = 0.
We note from (4.8) and (4.12) that
A
D
C =


a2 2a2 2a2 · · · 2a2
a3 2a3 · · · 2a3
a4 · · · 2a4
0
. . .
...
aL


and part c) follows. Part d) is immediate from a), b), and c). Finally we prove part e).
Using the result of d), one sees that
H
[
x
y1L−1
]
=
[
2a1 2a11
T
L−1
(a1I + AD)1L−1 ADC
] [
x
y1L−1
]
=
[
2a1{x + y(L− 1)}
{a1xI + xAD + yADC}1L−1
]
=
[
2a1
{yA
D
C + xa1I + xAD}1L−1
]
.
Proof of Lemma 4.7: By the deﬁnition of α3 in (4.15), one sees that α3(1 +
a1
aL
) = 2 a1
aL
,
so that α3 = 2
a1
aL
− a1
aL
α3 = a1(2 − α3) 1aL , proving a). For part b), we ﬁrst note that
2 − α3 = 2 −
2
a1
aL
1+
a1
aL
= 2
1+
a1
aL
. Hence from the deﬁnition of α4 in (4.15), one sees that
α4 = a1
2
1+
a1
aL
∆ = a1(2− α3)∆ , completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 4.8: From Lemma 4.5 d), one sees that
H
[
x
yf
]
=
[
2a1 2a11
T
L−1
(a1I + AD)1L−1 ADC
] [
x
yf
]
=
[
2a1(x + y
L−2
2
)
a1xI 1L−1 + xAD1L−1 + yADC f
]
=
[
2a1
yA
D
C f + a1x1L−1 + xAD1L−1
]
, completing the proof.
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Proof of Lemma 4.9: From Lemma 4.5 d), one sees that H
[
0
w(x, y)
]
=
[
2a1 2a11
T
L−1
(a1I + AD)1L−1 ADC
] [
0
w(x, y)
]
=
[
2a11
T
L−1w(x, y)
A
D
C w(x, y)
]
=
[
2a1
A
D
C w(x, y)
]
where 1TL−1w(x, y) = (L− 2)x + y = 1 is employed to yield the last equality.
Proof of Lemma 4.10: We ﬁrst note that (I − L
1
)L = L
1
and B−1 = I − L
1
so that
B−1C f = (I −L
1
)(I +2L)f = (I −L
1
+2L
1
)f = (I +L
1
)f = w(1, 0), proving part a). For
part b), one sees that B−11L−1 = (I − L1)1L−1 = 1L−1 − w(1, 0) = w(0, 1), completing the
proof.
Proof of Lemma 5.4: For r = 1, we ﬁrst note from (5.8) that mmin(1, L,N) = 1 and
hence from (5.10) min(1, L,N) = vL:1 − uN :1 = cH − cH = 0. For r = N − 1, it should be
noted from Proposition 5.3 that mmax(N − 1, L,N) = L − 1 for any L > L(2, N). It then
follows from (5.11) that max(N − 1, L,N) = uN :N − vˆL:L−1 = vˆL:L − vˆL:L−1 which goes to 0
as L → ∞ from (5.12). In general, for 2 ≤ r ≤ N − 1, one sees from Proposition 4.1 that
|vˆL:L− vˆL:L−1| > |vˆL:mmin(r,L,N)− vˆL:mmax(r−1,L,N)| = |{min(r, L,N)+uN :r}−{uN :r−max(r−
1, L,N)}| = |min(r, L,N) + max(r− 1, L,N)| , and the ﬁrst term goes to 0 as L →∞ from
(5.12), proving the lemma.
Proof of Lemma 5.5: Since vˆL:1 = uN :1, one has mmin(1, L,N) = 1. From (5.10), one
sees for 2 ≤ r ≤ N − 1 that min(r, L,N) = vˆL:mmin(r,L,N) − uN :r . Substituting (5.2) into
this, one has
min(r, L,N) =
1
D
(aL:mmin(r,L,N) − τN :r) . (A.1)
From (5.3), one sees that aL:mmin(r,L,N) − τN :r =
aL:L
(L−mmin(r, L,N))∆(L)aL:L + 1 − τN :r .
Part a) now follows by substituting this into (A.1) and solving for mmin(r, L,N). The proof
for part b) is similar to that for (5.14), completing the proof.
Proof of Lemma 5.6: We note that Z(1, L,N) = mmax(1, L,N)−mmin(1, L,N)+1 and
for 2 ≤ r ≤ N−1, Z(r, L,N) = mmax(r, L,N)−mmax(r−1, L,N). The lemma then follows
from Lemma 5.5.
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